Book excerpt: Abstract: This study examines the U.S. Army's execution of counterinsurgency in central Mexico during the Mexican American War (1 846-1848). It focuses on the leadership of General Winfield Scott and several of his key subordinates. In central Mexico, the U.S. Army anticipated the insurgency and instituted measures to destroy it from the beginning of the campaign. They overcame the resistance by conciliating the population then using Mexican civilians for intelligence to guide raids on guerrilla bases. These efforts successfully eliminated the insurgents as a factor in the peace negotiations so that the U.S. could achieve the terms they desired. U.S. success against the guerrillas convinced the Mexican leadership that the only way they could potentially defeat the Americans was through a long and painful insurgency, which most feared the nation could not endure. The only option that remained was to accept the U.S. peace proposal and cede the land they demanded. The Americans facilitated their success by setting reasonable goals for the conflict and once they were achieved rapidly evacuating the country. By keeping the occupation brief, they did not allow the resistance time to adapt their tactics or attain outside support. This thesis challenges the assertions of some historians that the U.S. defeated the insurgents by using "scorched-earth tactics" and that U.S. atrocities undermined their efforts to gain the support of the Mexican population. By "scorched earth tactics" they mean the Americans indiscriminately destroyed any residence on or near their supply routes to prevent the populace from abetting guerrilla warfare. The evidence does not support these assessments. While Winfield Scott's conciliatory policies were imperfectly executed and U.S. soldiers occasionally committed atrocities, the harsh disciplinary measures Scott enforced on his men, combined with the clear military superiority of the U.S. Army, were good enough to convince many Mexicans to provide the necessary information to crush the insurgency. Finally, the conclusion compares the Army's execution of counterinsurgency in Mexico to modem American military doctrine and draws out lessons that can be learned from the experience. The American Army won the counterinsurgency in Mexico because good leadership prevented the insurgents from affecting the war's outcome.