Book excerpt: The increasing demand for aviation complex products makes complex product manufacturers pay more attention to delivery efficiency, and the efficiency and effect of delivery problems are the key factors that restrict the delivery efficiency. This study aims to design a long-term effective incentive contract, which stimulates the subjective initiative of each technical business department to deal with delivery problems so as to improve delivery efficiency. We consider the behavioral characteristics of each technical business department (fairness preference, interrelationship diversity, technical capability, etc.) to expand the benchmark incentive model. The multi-stage incentive mechanism which combines the explicit incentives and implicit incentives are developed to explore the optimal delivery strategies based on a benchmark model. The results show that the incentive contracts can improve delivery efficiency and benefit delivery centers and technical business departments. The delivery decisions of the department are influenced by the closeness of department relationships and the fairness of assignment, and the departments tend to pay more effort in tasks with high relative importance and low effort cost. When the relative importance of tasks is equal to the ratio of marginal cost, a weak incentive zone in the delivery incentive contract is existed. The incentive effect of reputation effect is obvious except for the last stage. Base on the designed incentive contracts, the subjective initiative of the participants can be effectively stimulated to empower complex product delivery.