Book excerpt: Under the Constitution, Congress has no direct role in federal law enforcement and its ability to initiate appointments of any prosecutors to address alleged wrongdoings by executive officials is limited. While Congress retains broad oversight and investigatory powers under Article I of the Constitution, criminal investigations and prosecutions have generally been viewed as a core executive function and a responsibility of the executive branch. Historically, however, because of the potential conflicts of interest that may arise when the executive branch investigates itself there have been calls for an independently led inquiry to determine whether officials have violated criminal law. In response, Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have used both statutory and regulatory mechanisms to establish a process for such inquiries. These responses have attempted, in different ways, to balance the competing goals of independence and accountability with respect to inquiries of executive branch officials. Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Congress authorized the appointment of "special prosecutors," who later were known as "independent counsels." Under this statutory scheme, the Attorney General could request that a specially appointed three-judge panel appoint an outside individual to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of criminal law. These individuals were vested with "full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice" with respect to matters within their jurisdiction. The independent counsel provisions included sunset provisions, but were reauthorized regularly until 1992, when Congress allowed the law to expire. Although it was again reauthorized in 1994, debate over the scope, cost, and effect of the investigations (perhaps most notably the Iran-Contra investigation and the Whitewater investigation) resulted in the law's expiration and nonrenewal in 1999. Following the lapse of the statutory independent counsel provisions, DOJ promulgated regulations authorizing the Attorney General (or, if the Attorney General is recused from a matter, the Acting Attorney General) to appoint a "special counsel" to conduct specific investigations or prosecutions that may be deemed to present a conflict of interest if pursued under the normal procedures of the agency. Under these regulations, the Attorney General may appoint an individual from outside the federal government to investigate and prosecute criminal matters within his or her assigned jurisdiction. Two instances in which the Attorney General has invoked this authority include the investigation of the Branch Davidian incident in Waco, Texas, and the current investigation of alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election. Special counsels appointed under this authority are vested "within the scope of his or her jurisdiction, the full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney." Special counsels are not subject to "day-to-day supervision" by any official, but may be asked to report to the Attorney General during the course of their work. The Attorney General must "give great weight to the views of the Special Counsel" but may conclude that particular actions should not be pursued and must notify Congress accordingly if the Attorney General rejects a particular course of action. Additionally, the Attorney General maintains the authority to discipline or remove the special counsel for cause. Ultimately, the Attorney General holds the sole authority to initiate the appointment for such investigations and prosecutions. However, other alternatives of investigation and oversight of actions by federal officials-whose methods are beyond the scope of this report-are available, such as inspector general investigations and congressional oversight investigations.