The United States' Second Major Theater of War: A Bridge Too Far?
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 15 |
Release | : 2000 |
ISBN-10 | : OCLC:64435643 |
ISBN-13 | : |
Rating | : 4/5 (43 Downloads) |
Book excerpt: The United States National Security Strategy (NSS), as set forth by President William Jefferson Clinton in 1998, articulated the "Imperative for Engagement" abroad in order to remain secure at home in the aftermath of the "Cold War." Accordingly, in an era marked by globalization, transnational interests and threats, and ethnic and regional strife, ". . . the United States must be prepared to use all instruments of National Power, alone or in concert with allies and partners, to influence the actions of both state and non-state actors. It further states " we must have the demonstrated will and capabilities to continue to exert global leadership and remain the security partner for the community of states that share our interests." Implicit in our NSS is a commitment by the United States Government (USG) to dedicate the resources necessary to successfully execute this global engagement strategy. To that end, this paper will explore the National Military Strategy (NMS) intended to support an NSS of "Engagement," its three elements ("Shape, Respond, Prepare Now"), and the "Core Military Requirement" of being able to "deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theatres in overlapping time frames, preferably in conceit with regional allies." The basic question is: Does the military possess the capability in the decade ahead to execute this essential requirement? I submit the United States Armed Forces are capable of being defeated in a Second Major Theatre of War by a determined an opportunistic foe!